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Abstract: Hospital productivity has been a research topic for over two decades.  We expand 
on this research to include measures of dis/economies of scope.  By using the Free 
Coordination Hull (FCH) we are able to determine if hospitals in our sample can become 
more efficient if they provide more services (diseconomies of scope) or if two smaller 
hospitals with a reallocation of resources could become more efficient (economies of scope). 
Using data from the American Hospital Association for the years 2004-2007, we found 
variations among hospital markets (measured by the Core Based Statistical Area). We can 
determine whether dis/economies of scope exist by comparing the results from two linear 
programming problems. Focusing on four markets: Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Madison, WI , 
and New Orleans we found variations in how best these hospitals operating in these markets 
could change in order to increase both scale and scope efficiencies. This approach could be 
used by policy makers and managers in order to reduce costs by sharing, reducing, or 
expanding services in hospitals.  Findings from a study such as this should aid reform 
programs by providing more information on the sources of hospital inefficiency. 
 
Keywords:  Hospital, Efficiency, Economies of Scope, Hospital Markets 
 
IESEG Working Paper Series 2009-ECO-092 
 
1.  Introduction 
Health care’s share of U.S. GDP was 16.2% in 2007 and is expected to be 17.6% in 2009 
(Sisko et al., 2009).   U.S. national health expenditures (NHE) totaled $2.2 trillion dollars in 
2007; the largest single component of NHE, about one-third, was hospital care ($696.5 
billion).  Despite efforts to control costs, including the move from fee-for-service to 
prospective payment systems for hospital services and the introduction of managed care, there 
remains considerable evidence of inefficiencies in the provision of health care.  Much of the 
literature on the efficiency in health care has examined hospital efficiency. (See 
Hollingsworth et al., 1999, Hollingsworth, 2003, and Hollingsworth, 2008, for surveys of the 
literature on the efficiency of health care.) 
  We contribute to the body of evidence on the efficiency of hospitals in two ways.  
First, we examine two aspects of hospital efficiency that have received little attention—size 
efficiency (Maindiratta, 1990) and the efficiency of service offerings.  The first concept 
examines whether smaller or larger hospitals are more efficient; the second concept examines 
whether specialized or diversified service offerings are more efficient.  Second, to examine 
size and service offering efficiency we use modifications of both Maindiratta’s measure of 
size efficiency and of the free coordination hull (FCH)—a relatively new representation for 
technology—introduced by Green and Cook (2004). 
  The next section of the paper discusses the notions of size efficiency and the 
efficiency of service offerings and some of the health sector studies that examine these 
notions.  Section 3 develops the model used to assess size and service offering efficiency, 
while section 4 discusses the data used in our analysis and the results we obtain.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  Methods 
2.1  Literature Review  
Most studies of hospital efficiency focus on the measurement and, possibly, the determinants 
of technical efficiency.  Technical efficiency concerns how proficiently inputs are 
transformed into outputs.  Many hospital efficiency studies also examine scale efficiency—a 
measure of the potential gain available by scaling a hospital’s operation up (in the case of 
increasing returns) or down (in the case of decreasing returns) to “most productive scale size” 
(MPSS—i.e., constant returns to scale) in order to minimize the unit cost of production.   
Maindiratta (1990) introduced the related notion of size efficiency.  Size efficiency addresses 
the question of whether a given level of output could be more efficiently produced (i.e., lower 
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input usage) by a number of equally sized smaller firms that in aggregate produced the same 
level of output as the original, single larger firm. 
For example, suppose that the MPSS were 800 units of output, with increasing returns 
when fewer than 800 units were produced and decreasing returns when more than 800 units 
were produced.  Suppose that a hospital producing 1000 units of “output” was observed—the 
hospital would be scale inefficient because it is too large.  To become scale efficient, the 
hospital would have to contract output to 800 units—but what becomes of the 200 units of 
output the hospital “shed” to become scale efficient?  Size efficiency assumes that 1000 units 
of output need to be produced—it assesses whether the 1000 units are more efficiently 
produced using a single large (1000 unit) hospital, two 500 units hospitals, four 250 unit 
hospitals, etc.  In assessing the “optimal apportionment” of output, scale efficiency assumes 
that production can be scaled by non-integer amounts, while size efficiency restricts re-scaling 
to integer values.   
Maindiratta (1990) illustrated the concept of size efficiency using a random subset of 
the hospitals originally analyzed by Banker et al. (1986).  Of the fifty-five hospitals in 
Maindiratta’s sample, sixteen were smaller than or equal to MPSS; due to the convex nature 
of the technology he used in his model, these sixteen hospitals were all size efficient.  The 
remaining thirty-nine hospitals operated above MPSS—they were hence scale inefficient, but 
were not necessarily size inefficient.  Five of thirty-nine scale inefficient hospitals were found 
to be size efficient—re-apportioning output across a number of equally sized smaller firms 
would have resulted in input usage that exceeded that of the observed hospitals.  However, 
thirty-four of the thirty-nine scale inefficient hospitals were also found to be size inefficient.  
For the size inefficient hospitals, input usage could have been reduced if in each case output 
had been re-apportioned among a number of equally-sized smaller hospitals.  The number of 
hospitals among which observed output was re-apportioned ranged from two to seventeen, 
with a mean (mode) of 5.8 (2) smaller hospitals. 
Chattopadhyay and Ray (1996) examined the technical, scale, and size efficiency of a 
sample of 140 nursing homes operating in Connecticut in 1982-1983.  Fifty of the 140 nursing 
homes were larger than MPSS; of these, 39 were size efficient while 11 were size inefficient.  
Among the nursing homes operating over MPSS, the mean size efficiency was approximately 
0.92.  This compares with a mean scale efficiency score of approximately 0.97 for their full 
sample of 140 hospitals, suggesting that size inefficiency may be more costly than scale 
inefficiency. 
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  The size distribution of U.S. hospitals “has changed dramatically over time” (Santerre 
and Pepper, 2000; p. 183).  Santerre and Pepper (2000) report that throughout the twenty year 
period 1973 to 1993, the proportion of medium sized hospitals (100-299 beds) increased; 
changing from about 30% of all hospitals to almost 40% of all hospitals.  The proportion of 
large hospitals (300 and more beds) increased from 1973 to 1983, but then declined from 
1983 to 1993.  Santerre and Pepper (2000) attributed the observed evolution of hospital size to 
various market factors (e.g., managed care) and regulatory changes (e.g., changes in CON 
laws). 
Information on size efficiency can help guide policies that shape the U.S. hospital 
industry as it continues to evolve.  If size inefficiency exists, then a larger number of smaller 
hospitals would be more efficient than would a smaller number of larger hospitals.  Of course, 
size efficiency is just one of the determinants of “optimal” hospital size—other factors to 
consider include access to care, travel time, quality of care, etc. 
  While hospital size is one factor that affects costs, the number of services offered by 
hospitals is another cost influence.  Technological advances and the services that they 
engender have been blamed for the increasing cost of hospital care (Cutler, 2000).  To attract 
physicians and patients, hospitals may engage in non-price competition—competition on the 
variety and sophistication of services offered, for example. 
  It has long been argued that non-price competition leads to “slack” in both the capital 
and labor that hospitals employ; one argument was that physicians could then substitute the 
extra hospital inputs for their own time (Pauly, 1980).  As an example of slack in capital 
equipment, Brown et al. (1990) reported that by 1990 the estimated number of dedicated 
mammography machines would be almost four times the demand for the machines.  The 
noted that “[t]he current condition of excess supply is probably unsustainable over the long 
term” (Brown et al., 1990, p. 547).  This excess supply has not disappeared with time—Günes 
et al. (2004) cite a 2002 GAO study that estimated that only two-thirds of mammography 
machine capacity was being utilized. 
Kessler and McClellan (2000) have argued that the non-price competition waged 
among hospitals is tantamount to a “medical arms race,” which leads to a reduction in social 
welfare due to higher costs, excess capacity, and perhaps lower quality of care. In a study of 
Florida hospitals, Fournier and Mitchell (1992) concluded that while price competition had 
increased in the hospital industry, cost-raising non-price competition was still evident.  To 
combat the increasing rate of hospital cost growth, the Medicare Program introduced the 
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS).  Evaluation of this program demonstrated that 
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hospital cost growth was slowed by removing the financial incentives for hospitals to increase 
admissions, length of stays, and other inpatient treatments that could be substituted with 
outpatient care (Sloan et al., 1998). In addition to the imposition of a government cost 
reducing plan, Bamezai et al. (1999) found that over the period 1989-1994 the rise of PPOs 
and HMOs helped to reduce the duplication of amenities and services that non-price 
competition had previously existed, though only in “competitive hospital markets.”  Devers et 
al. (2003), on the other hand, argued that between 1996-1997 and 2000-2001 there was a shift 
in hospitals’ competitive strategies, whereby “a new medical arms race is emerging” with an 
attendant increase in “service mimicking and one-upmanship.”   
The American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals for fiscal year 2007 
lists 124 different services that could be provided by a hospital.  These services range from 
palliative care and social services to sophisticated radiological diagnostics, intensive care for a 
variety of patients (psychiatric, adult, and pediatric), and transplant surgeries.  The 
proliferation of services made possible by advances in medical technology and adopted in part 
due to the “arms race” among hospitals is likely to have led to higher health care costs.  
Without a commensurate demand for services, hospitals wishing to compete by offering a 
wide array services would still incur the costs associated with investing in and promoting the 
services.  Excess capacity would increase overall costs without any offsetting revenues.   
Conversely, with greater specialization, fewer hospitals would offer any given service, which 
would increase patient demand per hospital for the service and would likely lead to lower 
average costs and in turn lower prices.  Hospitals are labor intensive institutions; this is often 
cited as a reason why the hospital sector lags behind the rest of the U.S. economy in terms of 
productivity gains (Lichtenberg, 2003).  By specializing, hospitals could focus on their core 
competencies, thus improving productivity.
1  One role of hospitalists, a growing medical 
specialty in the U.S., is to help hospitals manage the utilization of sophisticated, and 
expensive, technologies (David et al., 2009) 
Since lower costs are a major objective in health care reform, ascertaining the optimal 
size and scope of services hospitals offer into the viable policy options available as part of 
health care reform.  In other words, our approach has practical applications since this 
information would provide hospital administrators and policy makers’ practical strategies that 
could lead to improved efficiency. 
                                                 
1 Greater specialization among hospitals would increase each hospital’s volume of services 
offered, which would increase capacity utilization and, potentially, quality (Kraus et al. 2005) 
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Of course, the provision of multiple services by a single provider may be cost 
advantageous—there may be cost “complementarities” among the services, the “integration” 
of services within a hospital may reduce transactions cost, etc.  The notion of “economies of 
scope” (Panzar and Willig, 1981) was developed to determine whether joint production of 
products is more cost effective than the separate production of the outputs by multiple firms.  
Panzar and Willig (1981) considered an extreme case—completely joint vs. completely dis-
jointed production.  Like many others, we use the term economies of scope more loosely; we 
are concerned with whether greater specialization (fewer services) or greater diversification 
(more services) is the more efficient production arrangement.   
For example, Prior and Solà (2000) analyzed economies of scope using data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) on a sample of Catalan hospitals.  They split their sample into 
hospitals with “balanced” output mixes and those that were more specialized in some of the 
outputs.  Using a two step application of DEA to various subsets of the data, they found that 
costs could be reduced through the diversification of the output mix offered.  However, Prior 
and Solà (2000) note that because they used DEA, the reference hospitals serving as the 
benchmarks in their analysis are only theoretically possible; this same problem plagues other 
studies using the DEA approach. 
Kittelsen and Magnussen (2003) also used DEA to examine economies of scope in 
hospital production.  Using a sample of Norwegian hospitals, they were interested in whether 
greater specialization should have been adopted as hospital ownership was transferred from 
the county to the state level.  To overcome the convexity limitation of DEA,
2 Kittelsen and 
Magnussen (2003) split their sample into output based quintiles—the top and bottom quintiles 
were deemed specialized, while the middle quintiles were deemed diversified.  They found 
some evidence of economies of scope, though average efficiency was higher for specialized 
hospitals than for diversified hospitals (which they noted may be an artifact of the DEA 
methodology).  
In a related study, Lee et al (2008) used a two step procedure to examine the 
relationship between specialization and hospital efficiency.  They first performed as DEA 
                                                 
2 Earlier studies have proposed ways to measure economies of scope using the 
nonparametric method DEA (e.g., Ferrier et al. (1993), Morita (2003)); unfortunately, DEA 
imposes convexity on the reference technology.  The drawback of convexity is that there can 
be no measure of efficiency improvements by specialization gains because, by construction, 
the convex combination of two or more production plans is always on or below the efficient 
frontier. 
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analysis and classified hospitals as either efficient or inefficient.  They then used an 
information theory based index of hospital (case—mix) specialization as an explanatory 
variable in a logistic regression (the dependent variable was “1” if a hospital was efficient and 
“0” if a hospital was inefficient).  Lee et al. (2008) found that more specialized hospitals were 
more likely to be efficient, suggesting that there was a benefit to specialization. 
Finally, Preyra and Pink (2006) reported that the Province of Quebec had recently 
undertaken a massive restructuring of its hospital sector, closing some hospitals, merging 
others, and transferring programs among the remaining hospitals.  Preyra and Pink (2006) 
analyzed data from Quebec’s hospital sector in the years prior to the restructuring in order to 
gauge the potential economies of scale and scope available from the restructuring.  Estimating 
non-frontier cost functions, they found evidence of potential efficiency gains due to scale and 
scope economies existed prior to the restructuring.  It is hoped that our approach can provide 
further insight into potential efficiency gains in the hospital sector. 
In this paper we model hospital production using the Free Coordination Hull (FCH) 
proposed by Green and Cook (2004).  The benefit of FCH over DEA is that FCH does not 
impose the convexity assumption that Kittelsen and Magnussen (2003) noted was problematic 
when assessing economies of scope.  By using the FCH approach we can generalize the 
Panzar and Willig (1981) concept of economies/diseconomies of scope in order to determine 
whether diversification of hospitals that provide more technological/health care services 
increases efficiency or whether more community oriented hospitals (i.e., fewer 
technological/health care services per hospital) would improve hospital efficiency.   
Furthermore, by using the additivity feature of FCH, we can determine whether 
reapportionment of existing hospitals into smaller more community oriented hospitals or 
diversification into larger, more technologically advanced hospitals (economies of scope) is 
the more viable policy alternative to improving productivity and efficiency which are 
necessary conditions for cost reductions.  While Maindiratta’s (1990) economies of size 
measure was limited to comparing an existing hospital to replications of a single smaller 
hospital, our approach allows reapportionment across any number of smaller hospitals.   
Therefore, we can inherently assess the effectiveness of mergers/or sharing services by two of 
these more community hospitals would provide good policy for reducing costs. 
  Given the interest in controlling health care costs and the inconclusive evidence on the 
role of size and scope on hospital costs, we hope to provide new insights into how hospitals 
services might be more efficiently provided by examining both the size efficiency and service 
offering efficiency of hospitals operating in the largest U.S. markets.  We do so by modifying 
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Maindiratta’s (1990) notion of size efficiency and by employing a modification of the FCH 
model.  We examine the potential optimal reapportionment of hospital activities by measuring 
efficiency under two different assumptions on technology.  Under our first assumption, we 
constrain the technology in order to compare the evaluated hospital with reference hospitals 
having the same activity level but with fewer technological services. Any inefficiency arising 
from this comparison could be interpreted as diseconomies of scope since it would show that 
the same activity could be done with fewer inputs and fewer technological services.  Under 
our second assumption, we constrain the technology to hospitals that offer more services. We 
can  then compute economies of scope where efficient referents have a larger scope of 
specialized activities in order to determine which assumption dominates the hospitals being 
evaluated by identifying the case  (assumption one vs. assumption two) where the potential 
gain in efficiency is the largest. 
 
2.2. The FCH Methodology 
We assume that hospital production involves the transformation of N inputs into M outputs, 
where  () 1,,
N
N x xxR + =∈ K  is the vector of inputs and  ( ) 1,,
M
M y yyR + =∈ K  is the vector of 
outputs.   The transformation of inputs into outputs is governed by technology, which can be 
represented by: 
( ){ } ,: T x y y y can be produced from x =    (1) 
The “best-practice” technology can be estimated from a sample of observed hospitals. 
Suppose that there are k = 1,…,K hospitals in the sample.  In many hospital efficiency studies, 
the technology is represented by the variable returns to scale data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) model (Banker et al., 1984): 
 
11 1
() , , 0 , 1
KK K
DEA k k k k k k
mm nn
kk k
Tx y y y m M x x n N λλ λ λ
== =
⎧⎫
=, : ≥ , ∀ ∈ ≤∀ ∈ ,≥ = ⎨⎬
⎩⎭ ∑∑ ∑   (2) 
 
Note that this is a convex technology—a linear combination of observed hospitals forms the 
reference technology, with the weight assigned to the k
th hospital in the linear combination 
given by λ
k.  Furthermore, there is no limit to the number of production plans that form the 
reference technology; however, the sum of the weights on reference production plans must 
sum to unity.  Under DEA, a “composite” hospital formed as the convex combination of 
sample hospital is used to assess the efficiency of each hospital in the sample. 
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An alternative representation of technology is given by the free disposal hull (FDH) 
model (Deprins et al., 1984): 
  {}
11 1
() , , 0 , 1 , 1
KK K
FDH k k k k k k
mm nn
kk k
Tx y y y m M x x n N λλ λ λ
== =
⎧⎫
=, : ≥ , ∀ ∈ ≤∀ ∈ , ∈ = ⎨⎬
⎩⎭ ∑∑ ∑  (3) 
 
The FDH technology does not impose convexity, so only observed hospitals (and not 
composites of observed hospitals) define the best-practice frontier relative to which efficiency 
is assessed.  However, under FDH only a single observed hospital serves as the benchmark 
against which efficiency is assessed; this can be seen by the restrictions on λ
k—the value must 
be 0 or 1 for each hospital and the values must sum to 1. 
A more recent representation of technology is the free coordination hull (FCH) 
technology (Green and Cook, 2004): 
{} () , , 0 , 1  
FCH k k k k k
mm nn
kK kK
Tx yy y m M x x n N k K λλ λ
∈∈
⎧⎫
=, : ≥ , ∀ ∈ ≤∀ ∈ , ∈ ∀ ∈ ⎨⎬
⎩⎭ ∑∑  (4) 
Unlike DEA, but like FDH, the FCH technology does not impose convexity.  Unlike DEA, 
but like FDH, “whole” observed hospitals rather than fractions of observed hospitals form the 
reference technology (i.e.,  { } 0,1
k λ ∈ as in FDH rather than  0
k λ ≥  as in DEA).  However, 
like DEA, but unlike FDH, multiple hospitals form the reference frontier (i.e., the summation 
restriction on λ
k that appears in the DEA and FDH technologies does not appear in the FCH 
technology).  With the FCH reference technology, a hospital can be evaluated in terms of 
other observed hospitals added together. 
  Because we want to measure the potential gain from the reapportionment of activities, 
we are interested in finding the frontier, or envelope, of the technology.  Following Shephard 
(1953, 1970) and Farrell (1957) this frontier can be derived using a distance function, which 
under standard assumptions provides a complete representation of technology.  By using an 
input orientation, observations interior to the envelope of the technology must contract their 
inputs until they are projected onto the technological frontier.  In particular, we use a 
directional input distance function, which can be written as: 
  () ( ) { } ,; s u p : , , ix x Dx yg R x g y T
δ
δδ + =∈− ∈
r
 (5) 
From (4) and (5), using the FCH representation of technology, the inefficiency of hospital j is 
given by the solution to the following linear program:  
 



































where δ  measures the maximal reduction of inputs required for projection onto the frontier. 
If  0, δ =  the hospital being evaluated is efficient in the sense that neither the observed 
hospital nor the addition of smaller hospitals could produce the same level of output with 
fewer inputs.  
  Since we are interested assessing a community type hospitals versus hospitals offering 
more services, we can vary the specification of the technology by which hospitals should be 
evaluated.  One option is to split the sample among hospitals as a function of the 
technological diversification—this this would be based on the number and types of services 
each hospital offers.  Alternatively, hospitals that have fewer technological services, but may 
focus on a particular “specialization” such as extensive diagnostics, for example, would only 
be compared with other hospitals sharing this distinction. 
  To develop an index of scope, we include the counts of services provided by the 
hospitals. Recall that we are interested in the comprehensive nature of hospital services.  We 
partition the full set of services into L broad categories.  We now introduce a vector of 
services,  () 1,, ,
L
L ss sR + =∈ K  which contains a count of services in each of the L grouping 
(In Table 1, we provide the groupings of services).  For each evaluated hospital we can now 
partition the reference set into more or less diversified technologies regarding a constraint on 
the variable ‘s’. (Specific services by groupings are listed in Appendix 1.)  We also evaluate 
hospitals at the CBSA level
3 which are aggregations of the largest cities, since this allows 
comparisons across hospital markets.  The technology, however, is still defined as the hospital 
level. 
  The inefficiency due to diseconomies of scope within hospitals in each CBSA is 
evaluated by the following program:  
                                                 
3 A new definition of the metropolitan areas, the “Core Based Statistical Area,” or CBSA, 
replaced the “Metropolitan Statistical Area” (MSA), after the 2000 U.S. Census. 
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The interpretation of the results given LP (7) is that for the hospital being evaluated to 
become more efficient it needs to offer fewer services.  
The potential gain in efficiency due to economies of scope of hospitals in an evaluated 
CBSA is evaluated by the following linear program:  
()
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In other words, for the hospital being evaluated using LP (8), the hospital should increase the 
number of services. 
We infer whether there are economies or diseconomies of scope within each CBSA by 
comparing the optimal solutions to the linear programming problems given by equations (7) 
and (8): 
1) If  { } max , , ii i DD D
−− + =
rr r
 then diseconomies of scope prevail and the activity in the 
evaluated CBSA could be maintained by reducing the total resources by δ  and by 
reducing the number of technological services. 
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2) If  { } max , , ii i DD D
+− + =
rr r
 then economies of scope arise and the activity could be 
maintained by reducing the total resources by δ  and by increasing the number of 
technological services. 
  The standard directional input distance function approach given by equation (6) only 
considers the inputs and outputs associated with a hospitals production technology.  By 
augmenting the standard directional input distance function by including constraints on the 
numbers of services offered within service categories (equations (7) and (8)), our empirical 
analysis adds a degree of complexity that allows us to discern whether there are economies or 
diseconomies of scope associated with service offerings. 
 
2.3. Data  
To study productivity and inefficiency due to either technical, size, or lack of specialization, 
we employ data drawn from the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals 
for the four years 2004-2007.  We use these data since the AHA is the most comprehensive 
data set of all hospitals operating in the U.S.   
  At the hospital level, the total sample size is 1,940.  This sample is broken down to 75 
CBSA over 4 years (2004-2007); see Table 2. To model the productive process in our sample, 
we specify inputs to include: the numbers of licensed and staffed beds, bassinets, operating 
rooms, full time equivalency (FTE) registered nurses, FTE licensed and practical nurses, FTE 
physicians, FTE residents and other medical trainees, and FTE other personnel. 
 We focus only on the hospital side of the operation rather than including both the 
hospital and the nursing home component operating within the hospital.  Outputs include the 
total numbers of case-mix adjusted admissions (the Medicare case mix index multiplied by 
the number of admissions), inpatient surgeries, outpatient surgeries; emergency room visits, 
outpatient visits, and births. 
 
3. Results 
As explained above, economies or diseconomies of scope will depend on  { } min , ii DD
−+ rr
.   
Over the 4 years 2004-2007, 57 CBSAs (19%) are efficient with respect to both the less and 
more diversified technologies.  Thus, hospitals operating in these CBSAs are size-efficient in 
the sense of Maindiratta (1990). They are also scope-efficient in the sense that they should not 
split their activities among more or less diversified hospitals. Among the remaining 
observations, 153 CBSAs (51%) are inefficient with respect to both the less and more 
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diversified technologies (i.e., they are inefficient with respect to both linear program (5) and 
(6)) indicating that they are inefficient with respect to both size and diversification.     The 
majority of these CBSAs (102 of the 153) would benefit from becoming more diversified; the 
remainder of these “doubly inefficient” CBSAs (51 of 153) would benefit by becoming less 
diversified.    
Ninety of our 300 observations are efficient with regards to one of the two 
technologies, but are inefficient with respect to the other.  Almost all of these, 89 of 98 
CBSAs, appear efficient relative to the less diversified technology, but inefficient with respect 
to the more diversified technology. We have, therefore, evidence suggesting the presence of 
economies of scope in this case.  However the converse is not true.  Only one CBSA appears 
efficient regarding the more diversified technology and inefficient compared to the less 
diversified; suggesting a potential gain from becoming less diversified.  Overall, the results 
indicate that more, not less diversification, is needed to improve performance.  
  Table 6 presents the findings on scope economies for each CBSA for each year in our 
sample.  Because of the specificity of our sample set, we focus our discussion of the results on 
four CBSAs representing four regions of the U.S.:  East (Philadelphia, PA), South (New 
Orleans, LA), Midwest (Madison, WI) and West (Los Angeles).  Interpretations of the other 
CBSAs are left to the reader. 
Our four example CBSAs are very different and inefficiencies that arose were due to 
different sources.  From our results, hospitals in Los Angeles can gain efficiency to a much 
larger degree by incorporating more diseconomies of scope.  Having more diversified 
hospitals rather than more community oriented hospitals would have served this hospital 
market better.  Conversely, our findings for Philadelphia suggest that improving efficiency in 
this market would come about with more community based rather than highly diversified 
hospitals. The hospitals operating in Madison are relatively efficient and practicing at the 
correct scale and scope in all four years of our sample.  This finding corresponds to another 
related finding, that average Medicare reimbursements in Madison are lower than for the rest 
of the state of Wisconsin—$5,213 for Madison hospitals as compared to $5,407 state-wide.  
In both Los Angeles and Philadelphia, Medicare reimbursements to these CBSA hospitals 
were $9,752 (California average $7,424) and $8,344 (Pennsylvania average $7,424) 
respectively.  We point this out to demonstrate earlier studies using non-parametric 
approaches, that more efficient practices are less costly, ceteris paribus.  
Our last case example, New Orleans is reviewed because of the wide spread 
destruction and hospital closures caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  In 2004, hospitals in 
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the New Orleans CBSA were only 4% inefficient, due to less economies of scope.  However, 
after Hurricane Katrina, particularly in 2007, we note a change—hospitals became relatively 
more efficient (2%) than in 2004.  Eliminating this small inefficiency could be achieved via 
diseconomies of scope. 
A summary of the distribution of “scope” economies by year appears in Table 7.  In 
2004, 17 (23% of) CBSA could gain from diseconomies of scope that it is they could improve 
their efficiency by reducing the number of activities (i.e., providing a smaller range of 
activities). 14 (19%) were efficient while the majority (59%) could benefit from economies of 
scope i.e., increasing the number of services. The results are quite stable with time. We can 
conclude than economies of scope are the main source of improvement in CBSA efficiency. 
But given our findings from the four example CBSAs, this is not generalizable across all 
cities, and individual care should be given when assessing specific market areas. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we utilized the Free Coordination Hull (FCH) representation of technology to 
examine the size and scope efficiency of the hospital market in 75 U.S. metropolitan areas 
(CBSAs) over four years, 2004-2007.  We found that, in general, hospital productivity would 
be enhanced if service offerings were expanded—i.e., for the vast majority of inefficiency 
CBSAs, performance would improve expanding the availability of services in the 
metropolitan area.  However, when assessing four separate examples, we found contrasting 
results.  Therefore, for efficient hospital coordination leading to lower costs is to occur, the 
policy prescription is different in Los Angeles (more diseconomies of scope or a 
concentration of more services in the hospitals) from what would be effective in Philadelphia.  
In this case, more economies of scope – fewer services in community oriented hospitals rather 
than a concentration of diversification.  Madison hospitals appeared efficient in all four years, 
and interestingly, this finding corresponds to another related finding, that average Medicare 
reimbursements in Madison are lower than for the rest of the state of Wisconsin— $5,213 for 
Madison hospitals as compared to $5,407 state-wide.  In both Los Angeles and Philadelphia, 
Medicare reimbursements to these CBSA hospitals were $9,752 (California average: $7,424) 
and $8,344 (Pennsylvania average: $7,424) respectively.  We point this out to demonstrate 
earlier studies using non-parametric approaches, that more efficient practices are less costly, 
ceteris paribus.  Whereas the causes of the relatively small inefficiencies in New Orleans 
changed from more community oriented hospitals (economies of scope) to more diseconomies 
of scope, i.e., diversified hospitals.  The required degree of diversification in New Orleans, 
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however, may have arisen from the closure of Charity Hospital (the large and diversified 
public teaching hospital) and if re-opened to its former status may eliminate the diseconomies 
of scope in the New Orleans CBSA. 
  Applying the findings from previous studies, we can surmise that Philadelphia 
hospitals would be more efficient if resources were reallocated throughout the CBSA, 
particularly with so many teaching hospitals in the Philadelphia area, each providing the most 
technologically advanced type of care.  In other words, sharing services among hospitals, as 
advocated by Bamezai et al. (1999), could increase efficiency and thereby lower costs. 
Conversely, the hospitals operating in the Los Angeles area may benefit by having more 
diversified i.e., the offering more services, would increase efficiency as suggested by the 
findings of Prior and Solà (2000).  Our finding in regards to Los Angeles hospitals may be 
due to the large population in the Los Angeles CBSA and the distance patients may have to 
travel for sophisticated care. 
  Our purpose in this paper was to demonstrate a novel approach in assessing the 
potential gains in hospital efficiency from either diversifying or reallocating services to more 
hospitals thereby saving costs via economies of scope.  A limitation of this study, however, 
was the lack of any quality of care measures.  Once more quality outcomes can be assessed at 
the hospital level, a more concise relationship between diversification and hospital efficiency 
can be gleaned.  
  Even in light of the shortcoming in our modeling and presenting methodology used 
here, this approach can be adapted to use quality based measures (when available on as large a 
scale as AHA hospital data) and allow hospital managers and health policy makers to 
determine the optimal size and number of services available across a CBSA.  By using a more 
rigorous approach such as the one presented here, policy makers can identify how best to 
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Table 1: Groups of services 
Group 1: General hospital characteristics 
Group 2: Types of short stay care 
Group 3: Types of special short stay care 
Group 4: Types of medium term care 
Group 5: Types of Long term care 
Group 6: Dedicated programs 
Group 7: Other types of services 
Group 8: Equipments 
 
Table 2:  Number of hospitals by CBSA and Year 
CBSA  2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Akron  2222 8  
Albuquerque  45431 6  
Anchorage  23231 0  
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta  98863 1  
Austin-Round Rock  6 6 8 10 30 
Bakersfield  65341 8  
Baltimore-Towson  12 11 13 13 49 
Baton Rouge  23251 2  
Birmingham-Hoover  98472 8  
Boston-Quincy  56652 2  
Buffalo-Niagara Falls  23231 0  
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord  55552 0  
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet  24 21 20 15 80 
Cincinnati-Middletown  67682 7  
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor  8 9 10 11 38 
Colorado Springs  2211 6  
Columbus  65662 3  
Corpus Christi  2122 7  
Dallas-Plano-Irving  12 11 14 17 54 
Denver-Aurora  87862 9  
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn  66652 3  
El Paso  67762 6  
Fort Wayne  34431 4  
Fort Worth-Arlington  9 9 10 10 38 
Fresno  33341 3  
Greensboro-High Point  1111 4  
Honolulu  55541 9  
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown  18 18 19 18 73 
Indianapolis  23451 4  
Jacksonville  45551 9  
Kansas City  88662 8  
Las Vegas-Paradise  56562 2  
Lexington-Fayette  55541 9  
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Lincoln  2222 8  
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale  39 39 34 30 142 
Louisville  55451 9  
Lubbock  33331 2  
Madison  32331 1  
Memphis  54211 2  
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall  9 6 10 8 33 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis  77752 6  
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington  67552 3  
Modesto  33221 0  
Montgomery  1133 8  
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro  65642 1  
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner  42351 4  
New York-White Plains-Wayne  31 28 29 34 122 
Newark-Union  45431 6  
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward  23231 0  
Oklahoma City  77872 9  
Omaha-Council Bluffs  44551 8  
Philadelphia  12 10 10 10 42 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale  15 16 18 17 66 
Pittsburgh  88883 2  
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton  66662 4  
Raleigh-Cary  33331 2  
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario  54331 5  
Rochester  43231 2  
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville  66662 4  
San Antonio  67772 7  
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos  66562 3  
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City 87672 8  
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara  55531 8  
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine  75562 3  
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett  65662 3  
Shreveport-Bossier City  42221 0  
St. Louis  12 12 12 12 48 
Stockton  2222 8  
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater  88683 0  
Toledo  44441 6  
Tucson  66452 1  
Tulsa  55562 1  
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News  66662 4  
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria  44551 8  
Wichita  32241 1  
Total  499 483 476 482 1940 
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Table 3:  Descriptive statistics of the inputs 
 2004  2005  2006  2007 
Inputs Mean  S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.
Beds  362.5 241.5 367.7 249.0 366.6 246.1 365.3 259.8
Bassinets  26.6 24.3 26.9 25.0 26.1 25.6 26.0 25.2
Operating  Rooms 16.1 13.2 16.6 12.9 17.2 13.3 17.3 14.1
FTE_Doctors 55.4  165.1 56.6 175.5 62.6 189.0  63.7 191.4
FTE_Trainees  94.3 208.6 93.6 205.7 95.7 209.3 106.2 228.2
FTE_RN  581.6 506.0 615.3 533.1 634.2 555.7 667.7 591.0
FTE_LPN  42.9 49.2 41.0 47.0 37.4 44.5 37.3 47.6
FTE_Other  Labor 1452.4 1415.5 1529.4 1431.1 1222.5 1220.6 1553.2 1491.6
 
Table 4:  Descriptive statistics of the outputs 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Outputs Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean  S.D.  Mean S.D.
Births 2275 2142.6 2289 2153.9 2316  2231.0  2349 2283.2
CMI-Adjusted Admissions  29526 4465.2 30168 4708.2 30307  4605.4  30493 4933.1
Surgery Inpatients  5544 8335.9 5662 8752.9 5718  8675.8  5789 9066.0
Surgery Outpatients  7400 6103.8 7804 6534.2 7509  6866.3  7780 7176.0
Emergency Outpatients  47021 4462.0 48188 4542.4 49471  4686.7  50804 4958.6
Other Outpatients  197473 6457.0 205640 9167.0 218710  7377.7  217651 7572.2
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Table 5: Efficiency of CBSAs under LP (5) and LP (6) 
 
                               




# (%) Inefficient # (%)  Efficient Total 






















Table 6:  Potential Gain Associated with Dis/Economies of Scope by CBSA by Year 
CBSA  2004  2005  2006  2007 
  Ineff. Type
1  Ineff. Type  Ineff. Type  Ineff.  Type 
Akron  0.13 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.01 ECO  0.03  ECO 
Albuquerque  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.02 ECO  0.17  ECO 
Anchorage  0.00 EFF  0.03 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.03  ECO 
Atlanta‐Sandy Springs‐Marietta  0.23 ECO  0.20 ECO  0.18 ECO  0.16  ECO 
Austin‐Round Rock  0.07 ECO  0.10 ECO  0.02 ECO  0.09  ECO 
Bakersfield  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Baltimore‐Towson  0.15 DIS  0.16 ECO  0.10 DIS  0.15  DIS 
Baton Rouge  0.13 ECO  0.23 ECO  0.04 ECO  0.15  ECO 
Birmingham‐Hoover  0.23 DIS  0.25 DIS  0.25 ECO  0.20  ECO 
Boston‐Quincy  0.11 ECO  0.15 ECO  0.11 ECO  0.12  ECO 
Buffalo‐Niagara Falls  0.00 EFF  0.14 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.28  ECO 
Charlotte‐Gastonia‐Concord  0.20 ECO  0.16 ECO  0.15 ECO  0.16  ECO 
Chicago‐Naperville‐Joliet  0.26 DIS  0.29 DIS  0.29 DIS  0.28  DIS 
Cincinnati‐Middletown  0.10 ECO  0.12 ECO  0.10 ECO  0.14  DIS 
Cleveland‐Elyria‐Mentor  0.20 ECO  0.16 ECO  0.14 ECO  0.19  ECO 
Colorado Springs  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Columbus  0.19 ECO  0.19 ECO  0.06 ECO  0.10  ECO 
Corpus Christi  0.09 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.04  ECO 
Dallas‐Plano‐Irving  0.23 ECO  0.24 ECO  0.23 ECO  0.27  ECO 
Denver‐Aurora  0.25 DIS  0.28 DIS  0.30 DIS  0.31  DIS 
Detroit‐Livonia‐Dearborn  0.11 ECO  0.10 ECO  0.08 ECO  0.04  ECO 
El Paso  0.02 ECO  0.03 ECO  0.09 ECO  0.00  EFF 
Fort Wayne  0.24 ECO  0.22 ECO  0.15 DIS  0.22  DIS 
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Fort Worth‐Arlington  0.21 DIS  0.22 ECO  0.17 ECO  0.18  ECO 
Fresno  0.02 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.02  ECO 
Greensboro‐High Point  0.25 ECO  0.20 ECO  0.17 ECO  0.14  ECO 
Honolulu  0.10 DIS  0.17 ECO  0.16 DIS  0.18  ECO 
Houston‐Sugar Land‐Baytown  0.23 ECO  0.23 ECO  0.22 ECO  0.25  DIS 
Indianapolis  0.30 ECO  0.26 ECO  0.25 ECO  0.36  ECO 
Jacksonville  0.13 ECO  0.19 ECO  0.15 ECO  0.21  ECO 
Kansas City  0.25 DIS  0.32 DIS  0.33 DIS  0.19  DIS 
Las Vegas‐Paradise  0.00 EFF  0.05 ECO  0.05 ECO  0.11  ECO 
Lexington‐Fayette  0.04 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.07 ECO  0.07  ECO 
Lincoln  0.04 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.04 ECO  0.01  ECO 
Los Angeles‐Long Beach‐
Glendale 
0.29 DIS  0.31 DIS  0.32 DIS  0.29  DIS 
Louisville  0.19 ECO  0.18 ECO  0.10 ECO  0.16  ECO 
Lubbock  0.18 ECO  0.22 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.18  ECO 
Madison  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Memphis  0.29 ECO  0.29 ECO  0.01 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Miami‐Miami Beach‐Kendall  0.32 DIS  0.33 ECO  0.27 ECO  0.31  ECO 
Milwaukee‐Waukesha‐West 
Allis 
0.09 DIS  0.14 ECO  0.07 DIS  0.12  EFF 
Minneapolis‐St. Paul‐
Bloomington 
0.13 DIS  0.17 DIS  0.17 DIS  0.19  ECO 
Modesto  0.03 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.01  ECO 
Montgomery  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.04 ECO  0.04  ECO 
Nashville‐Davidson‐‐
Murfreesboro 
0.15 ECO  0.08 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.00  EFF 
New Orleans‐Metairie‐Kenner  0.04 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.02  DIS 
New York‐White Plains‐Wayne  0.17 ECO  0.16 ECO  0.12 ECO  0.11  ECO 
Newark‐Union  0.12 ECO  0.04 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Oakland‐Fremont‐Hayward  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.15  ECO 
Oklahoma City  0.21 ECO  0.28 ECO  0.28 ECO  0.27  DIS 
Omaha‐Council Bluffs  0.20 DIS  0.23 ECO  0.15 DIS  0.14  DIS 
Philadelphia  0.20 ECO  0.20 ECO  0.17 ECO  0.17  ECO 
Phoenix‐Mesa‐Scottsdale  0.07 DIS  0.08 ECO  0.08 ECO  0.09  ECO 
Pittsburgh  0.17 ECO  0.12 ECO  0.15 ECO  0.20  ECO 
Portland‐Vancouver‐Beaverton  0.08 ECO  0.09 ECO  0.06 ECO  0.09  ECO 
Raleigh‐Cary  0.00 EFF  0.04 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Riverside‐San Bernardino‐
Ontario 
0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Rochester  0.17 ECO  0.18 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.14  ECO 
Sacramento‐‐Arden‐Arcade‐‐
Roseville 
0.15 ECO  0.09 ECO  0.00 ECO  0.10  ECO 
San Antonio  0.21 ECO  0.19 ECO  0.23 ECO  0.21  ECO 
San Diego‐Carlsbad‐San Marcos  0.15 ECO  0.23 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.08  ECO 
San Francisco‐San Mateo‐
Redwood City 
0.10 DIS  0.18 ECO  0.17 ECO  0.31  ECO 
San Jose‐Sunnyvale‐Santa Clara  0.05 DIS  0.08 ECO  0.10 ECO  0.07  ECO 
Santa Ana‐Anaheim‐Irvine  0.00 EFF  0.00 ECO  0.00 EFF  0.00  DIS 
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Seattle‐Bellevue‐Everett  0.13 ECO  0.11 DIS  0.16 DIS  0.17  ECO 
Shreveport‐Bossier City  0.30 ECO  0.22 ECO  0.20 ECO  0.13  ECO 
St. Louis  0.27 DIS  0.28 DIS  0.27 ECO  0.22  DIS 
Stockton  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Tampa‐St. Petersburg‐
Clearwater 
0.25 ECO  0.20 ECO  0.18 ECO  0.18  ECO 
Toledo  0.23 ECO  0.21 ECO  0.15 DIS  0.15  DIS 
Tucson  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00 EFF  0.00  EFF 
Tulsa  0.03 ECO  0.08 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.16  ECO 
Virginia Beach‐Norfolk‐Newport 
News 
0.16 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.06 ECO  0.06  ECO 
Washington‐Arlington‐
Alexandria 
0.18 DIS  0.22 ECO  0.19 ECO  0.20  DIS 
Wichita  0.11 ECO  0.13 ECO  0.08 ECO  0.15  ECO 
Total  0.13   0.14   0.11   0.13   
1: Gain in Diseconomy of scope: DIS 
    Efficient: EFF 





Table 7:  The Distribution of Economies and Diseconomies by Year 
 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
DIS  17 (23%) 8 (11%) 12 (16%) 15 (20%) 
EFF  14 (19%) 14 (19%) 17 (23%) 12 (16%) 
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Appendix 1: Grouping of hospitals services 
Group 1:  General hospital services 
G1  GENERAL MEDICAL AND SURGICAL CARE (ADULT)  
G1  GENERAL MEDICAL AND SURGICAL CARE (PEDIATRIC) 
G1 CRITICAL  ACCESS  HOSPITAL 
G1  RURAL REFERRAL CENTER 
G1  SOLE COMMUNITY PROVIDER 
G1 EMERGENCY  DEPARTMENT 
G1 CERTIFIED  TRAUMA  CENTER 
G1  LEVEL OF TRAUMA CENTER 
G1 LONG  TERM  CARE 
Group 2:  Short stay care 
G2 OBSTETRICS  CARE 
G2 PHYSICAL  REHABILITATION  CARE 
G2 AUXILIARY 
G2  PAIN MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
G2 ONCOLOGY  SERVICES 
Group 3:  Special short stay care 
G3  NEONATAL INTERMEDIATE CARE 
G3  MEDICAL/SURGICAL INTENSIVE CARE 
G3  CARDIAC INTENSIVE CARE 
G3  NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE 
G3  PEDIATRIC INTENSIVE CARE 
G3 BURN  CARE 
G3  OTHER SPECIAL CARE 
G3 OTHER  INTENSIVE  CARE 
G3 CHEMOTHERAPY 
G3 HEMODIALYSIS  SERVICES 
G3  BONE MARROW, HEART, KIDNEY, LIVER,  LUNG, TISSUE, &   OTHER TRANSPLANT
Group 4:  Medium term care 
G4  ALCOHOL/DRUG ABUSE OR DEPENDENCY INPATIENT CARE 
G4 PSYCHIATRIC  CARE 
G4  PSYCHIATRIC CHILD/ADOLESCENT SERVICES 
G4  PSYCHIATRIC CONSULTATION/LIAISON SERVICES 
G4  PSYCHIATRIC EDUCATION SERVICES 
G4  PSYCHIATRIC EMERGENCY SERVICES 
G4  PSYCHIATRIC GERIATRIC SERVICES 
G4  PSYCHIATRIC OUTPATIENT SERVICES 
G4 PSYCHIATRIC  PARTIAL  HOSPITALIZATION PROGRAM 
Group 5: Long term care 
G5  SKILLED NURSING CARE 
G5  INTERMEDIATE NURSING CARE 
G5  ACUTE LONG TERM CARE 
G5 OTHER  LONG-TERM  CARE 
G5 OTHER  CARE 
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Group 6: Dedicated programs 
G6  ADULT DAY CARE PROGRAM 
G6  AIRBORNE INFECTION ISOLATION ROOM 
G6  ALCOHOL/DRUG ABUSE OR DEPENDENCY OUTPATIENT SERVICES 
G6 ALZHEIMER  CENTER 
G6 AMBULANCE  SERVICES 
G6 ARTHRITIS  TREATMENT CENTER 
G6 ASSISTED  LIVING  SERVICES 
G6  BARIATRIC/WEIGHT CONTROL SERVICES 
G6  BIRTHING ROOM/LDR ROOM/LDRP ROOM 
G6  BREAST CANCER SCREENING/MAMMOGRAMS 
G6 CASE  MANAGEMENT 
G6  CHAPLAINCY/PASTORAL CARE SERVICES 
G6 CHILDREN  WELLNESS  PROGRAM 
G6 CHIROPRACTIC  SERVICES 
G6 COMMUNITY  OUTREACH 
G6 COMPLEMENTARY  MEDICINE  SERVICES 
G6 CRISIS  PREVENTION 
G6 DENTAL  SERVICES 
G6  ENABLING SERVICES  
G6 HOSPICE 
G6  PALLIATIVE CARE PROGRAM  
G6  ENROLLMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
G6 FITNESS  CENTER 
G6 FREESTANDING  OUTPATIENT  CENTER 
G6 GERIATRIC  SERVICES 
G6 HEALTH  FAIR 
G6  HEALTH INFORMATION CENTER 
G6 HEALTH  SCREENINGS 
G6 HIV-AIDS  SERVICES 
G6  HOME HEALTH SERVICES 
G6  HOSPITAL-BASE OUTPATIENT CARE CENTER/SERVICES 
G6 LINGUISTIC/TRANSLATION  SERVICES 
G6 MEALS  ON  WHEELS 
G6 NEUROLOGICAL  SERVICES 
G6 NUTRITION  PROGRAMS 
G6 OCCUPATIONAL  HEALTH  SERVICES 
G6 ORTHOPEDIC  SERVICES 
G6 OUTPATIENT  SURGERY 
G6 PATIENT  CONTROLLED  ANALGESIA 
G6  PATIENT EDUCATION CENTER 
G6 PATIENT  REPRESENTATIVE  SERVICES 
G6  PHYSICAL REHABILITATION OUTPATIENT SERVICES 
G6  PRIMARY CARE DEPARTMENT 
Group 7:  Other types of services 
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G7 ADULT  DIAGNOSTIC/INVASIVE CATHETERIZATION 
G7 PEDIATRIC  DIAGNOSTIC/INVASIVE CATHETERIZATION 
G7  ADULT INTERVENTIONAL CARDIAC CATHETERIZATION 
G7 PEDIATRIC  INTERVENTIONAL CARDIAC CATHETERIZATION 
G7  ADULT CARDIAC SURGERY 
G7  PEDIATRIC CARDIAC SURGERY 
G7 FERTILITY  CLINIC 
G7 GENETIC  TESTING/COUNSELING   
G7 RETIREMENT  HOUSING 
G7 SLEEP  CENTER 
G7 SOCIAL  WORK  SERVICES 
G7 SPORTS  MEDICINE 
G7 SUPPORT  GROUPS 
G7 SWING  BED  SERVICES 
G7  TEEN OUTREACH SERVICES 
G7 TOBACCO  TREATMENT  SERVICES 
G7  TRANSPORTATION TO HEALTH SERVICES 
G7  URGENT CARE CENTER 
G7  VOLUNTEER SERVICES DEPARTMENT 
G7 WOMEN'S  HEALTH  CENTER/SERVICES 
G7  WOUND MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
Group 8:  Equipment 
G8  IMAGE-GUIDED RADIATION THERAPY  
G8  INTENSITY-MODULATED RADIATION THERAPY (IMRT)  
G8 ELECTRON  BEAM  COMPUTED TOMOGRAPHY (EBCT) 
G8  MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (MRI) 
G8  POSITRON EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY (PET) 
G8  POSITRON EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY/CT (PET/CT) 
G8  SINGLE PHOTON EMISSION COMPUTERIZED TOMOGRAPHY (SPECT) 
G8  COMPUTED-TOMOGRAPHY (CT) SCANNER 
G8 DIAGNOSTIC  RADIOISOTOPE FACILITY 
G8  MULTISLICE SPIRAL COMPUTED TOMOGRAPHY < 64 SLICE 
G8 ULTRASOUND 
G8  SHAPED BEAM RADIATION SYSTEM 
G8  EXTRACORPOREAL SHOCK-WAVE LITHOTRIPTER (ESWL) 
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